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Abstract
The focus of research on the Niger Delta has shifted considerably 
from the large-scale violence affecting the region, to the effects of the 
post-amnesty era which followed the introduction of the Presidential 
Amnesty Programme (PAP) by the government in 2009. Unfortunately, 
the emergent literature on the amnesty topic has been pessimistic in its 
reductionist assessment of the whole programme as a mere ‘cash-for-peace’ 
or ‘settlement’ exercise which can only lead to a fragile peace in the Niger 
Delta. This paper, being a product of an in-depth investigation of the 
programme through direct observations and field interviews, presents a 
different perspective. The paper demonstrates the capacity of the amnesty 
programme to facilitate and sustain peace in the troubled Niger Delta, with 
specific focus on the reintegration aspect of the PAP. The paper shows that 
the reintegration programme has recorded some positive progress which 
has not been well captured in the literature. Indeed, these achievements 
are a clear sign of the potential of the PAP to bring about a lasting peace 
in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, the paper analyses the current challenges 
bedevilling the programme. Following the highlighted challenges, the 
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paper offers recommendations on how the reintegration programme can 
be properly utilised to sustain peace in the Niger Delta. 
Keywords: Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), 
ex-combatants, Amnesty Programme, Niger Delta
Introduction
In the 2000s, issues concerning the Niger Delta were more popular in 
research on the Nigerian state. Clearly, this was informed by the fact that the 
period was synonymous with the age of increased agitations and violence 
in the oil-rich Niger Delta region. The large-scale violence experienced 
in the region in that period drastically affected Nigeria’s oil production 
and exportation, with devastating effects on the country’s economy given 
its over reliance on oil earnings as its national income. For instance, 
Nigeria’s oil production sharply dropped from 2.6 million barrels (per day) 
to 1.3 million barrels (per day) between 2005 and 2009, in the midst of 
consistent attacks on oil installations and kidnapping of oil workers by the 
militia groups in the region (Obi 2010). Given this situation, researchers 
were preoccupied with the task of studying the patterns of violence and 
agitation in the region, which produced works that analyse the origins of 
the crisis, the various actors involved in the crisis (their interests, solutions 
and recommendations), and other topical issues around the Niger Delta 
conf lict (for example, Human Rights Watch 1999; Obi 1997; 2007; 2009; 
Oyefusi 2007; Omotola 2009; Ikelegbe 2005). 
With the introduction and implementation of the Presidential Amnesty 
Programme (PAP) by the Nigerian government in 2009 – which has become 
the euphemism for the government’s Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration (DDR) policy on the Niger Delta – the direction of research 
naturally changed, and attention has increasingly shifted to the post-amnesty 
era of the Niger Delta. As such, there has been an appreciable development 
of literature on the topic of amnesty in the Niger Delta (Aghedo 2013; Ushie 
2013; Eke 2014; Obi 2014; Agbiboa 2014; Oluwaniyi 2011a; Ojeleye 2011; 
Davidheiser and Nyiayaana 2011). While a handful of work on the topic 
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has indeed been useful to understanding the background, challenges, and 
sustainability of the amnesty policy as a peace strategy in the Niger Delta, 
the main thrust of their assessment emphasises the negative aspects of the 
policy with some sceptic views of the programme. For example, Cyril Obi 
argues that ‘… evidence so far suggests that the PAP is at best a fragile basis 
for sustaining peace and development in the oil-rich region in the medium 
to long term’ (Obi 2014:254). He further concludes: ‘The PAP has delivered 
to the government (rather than the people) the type of peace consistent 
with a status quo that maintains conditions for state ownership of oil, its 
optimal extraction in partnership with oil multinationals and the sharing 
of the spoils’ (Obi 2014:254). In a similar vein, Surulola Eke is of the view 
that ‘the deal was a “cash for peace” programme cloaked in “amnesty”; 
which has inadvertently increased the appeal of violence for those who seek 
a slice of the so-called “national cake”’ (Eke 2014:1). 
After a considerable period of active engagement with the PAP through 
a series of interviews with ex-combatants and coordinators of the 
reintegration programme, including direct observation of the skills 
training centres (for the reintegration programme), the authors of this 
paper present an alternative perspective to the existing perspective and 
narratives of the PAP in Nigeria.1 This study, therefore, demonstrates 
with empirical evidence the effectiveness of the amnesty programme in 
peace efforts in the troubled Niger Delta, with a particular focus on the 
reintegration aspect of the PAP. The reintegration part of the programme is 
specially chosen for analysis because it represents the most important stage 
for any DDR programme as it aims to complete the peacebuilding process 
and prevent a relapse into violence. Moreover, the reintegration stage forms 
the present stage of the PAP of the Nigerian government. Notwithstanding 
the aim of the paper, which illustrates some of the progress recorded in 
the reintegration process, some of the major challenges to the programme 
1 The first author was officially assigned the duty of monitoring and evaluating the progress 
of the training programmes under the amnesty policy in South Africa in 2013. This 
enhanced a direct assessment of the programme. The second author was on a field study to 
the Amnesty Office in Abuja, Bayelsa and Rivers States for his doctoral project. 
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are presented. This offers more support for the paper’s objectivity and 
dismisses claims of a pro-government bias. 
To accomplish its task, the paper is divided into five sections (excluding 
the introductory section). The first section offers a conceptual analysis 
of reintegration and demonstrates its importance in a post-conf lict 
peacebuilding process. The second section presents an overview of the PAP 
and DDR strategy of the Nigerian government, showing the process that 
led to the programme with its objectives as outlined by the government. 
The third section specifically addresses the reintegration part of the 
programme and how it is designed to work in the Niger Delta. The fourth 
section analyses the observable progress and challenges in the process of 
the reintegration programme. Finally, the last section presents a summary 
and conclusion of the paper. A set of recommendations is also provided on 
how to maintain peace in the Niger Delta. 
1. Reintegration in a peacebuilding process: A conceptual 
analysis
‘Reintegration’ – defined as ‘the process by which ex-combatants acquire 
civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income’ (United 
Nations 2006) – represents a stage in the DDR programme, which derives 
its origin from the concept of ‘peacebuilding’, first introduced by former 
Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his proposals for reform in 
the United Nations (UN). In the report, otherwise known as ‘An Agenda 
for Peace’, Boutros-Ghali advocated for ‘comprehensive efforts to identify 
and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance 
a sense of confidence and well-being among people’ in a post-conf lict 
environment (United Nations 1992). For these purposes, Boutros-Ghali 
identified the following strategies: disarming combatants, restoring order, 
destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training 
support for security personnel, human rights protection, strengthening of 
government institutions, and promotion of public participation (United 
Nations 1992; also see Knight 2008). Scholars and practitioners have 
concluded that these strategies represent a basis for the ‘Disarmament, 
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Demobilisation and Reintegration’ process that has become a useful tool 
for conf lict resolution and peacekeeping efforts (Knight 2008:26).
Following Boutros-Ghali’s report, the UN through its Security Council 
fully adopted the DDR strategy in 1999 (Knight 2008:26). By 2000, it 
was reported that the UN had implemented DDR in fifteen peacekeeping 
operations (United Nations 2000:8). The Brahimi report, an outcome of a 
high-level panel set up to review the peace operations of the UN in 2000, 
further emphasised the importance of the DDR, which was seen as ‘key 
to immediate post-conf lict stability and reduced likelihood of conf lict 
recurrence’ (United Nations 2000:7). The report facilitated the widening 
of the scope of DDR to include socio-economic dimensions to post-conf lict 
peace operations. This was concretised with the Integrated DDR Standards 
(IDDRS) report published in 2006 (United Nations 2010:9–10). In 2010, 
a further advance was experienced in the development of the concept 
following the introduction of the ‘Second Generation’ DDR. The Second 
Generation was conceived to address the shortcomings of the ‘traditional 
model’, somewhat narrowly concerned with addressing the military 
aspects of conf lict. Thus, the Second Generation is designed to take a 
holistic approach to post-conf lict peacebuilding and includes the whole 
community in its scope (United Nations 2010).
The reintegration process, which is the central focus in this study, is 
indeed important to the DDR process. This is because disarmament and 
demobilisation of combatants would be meaningless without the creation 
of fresh socio-economic opportunities for the ex-combatants, which 
would prevent them from reconsidering their violent past efforts. Indeed, 
experience has shown that frustrated and unemployed ex-combatants have 
been involved in activities that ultimately lead to resurgence of insecurity 
in post-conf lict states (Watson 2009). Therefore, reintegration strategies 
are undertaken after disarmament and demobilisation, which often involve 
direct monetary packages, provision of job opportunities, skills acquisition 
programmes, income-generation enterprises and other social reintegration 
policies to ex-combatants in exchange for their commitment not to take 
up arms against the state again (Knight 2008:29). Despite the potential of 
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the reintegration programme in peace-making process, the concept has not 
been spared of criticism. 
Some of the issues raised about reintegration by scholars and practitioners 
are the following: ambiguity in the timeframe for reintegration – whether 
it is in the short-term or long-term; imprecision about the basic elements 
of reintegration and how to measure the success of the programme; its 
inadequacy in addressing the root causes of the conf lict; over-concentration 
on armed groups and neglect of other social groups affected in conf lict 
(Hazen 2011; Jennings 2008). In response to some of these concerns, 
significant policy measures have been taken by important multilateral 
agencies, national governments and non-governmental agencies. For 
example, the concept of ‘reinsertion’ was introduced to differentiate between 
the short-term and long-term aspects of reintegration by the UN. The 
reinsertion was defined as ‘short-term material and/or financial assistance 
to meet immediate needs’ (United Nations 2006). It is aimed at keeping 
‘ex-combatants off the street’ and providing ‘transitional assistance’ to 
ex-combatants and their families before reintegration is fully implemented 
(Hazen 2011:199). In addition, the Swedish government through the 
Stockholm Initiative on DDR (SIDDR) recommended the inclusion of 
‘neglected beneficiaries’ such as women, children and landless youth in the 
reintegration process (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden 2006). Indeed, 
this particular recommendation has been included in the framework 
of Second Generation. Also, there have been calls for mainstreaming 
reintegration programmes into national poverty eradication and socio-
economic development schemes in order to guarantee the sustainability of 
the reintegration programme (International Labour Organisation 2009).
2. Amnesty programme and DDR in Niger Delta
As alluded to earlier, the volley of violence in the Niger Delta has been well 
captured in numerous studies. For this reason, we do not see any reason for 
much repetition here. It is, however, incontrovertible that the Niger Delta 
conf lict marks a major chapter in Nigeria’s history. Nigeria experienced 
the intensity of the crisis in the 2000s. For example, it was reported that 
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ninety-two attacks on the oil industry were carried out in 2008 alone, and 
almost one thousand people were killed in the period (International Crisis 
Group 2009:2). In a bid to find a solution to the crisis, several measures 
were taken by the government. These measures were undertaken through 
violent and non-violent approaches. First, the non-violent approach: the 
government established some developmental agencies to address rising 
concerns over developmental challenges in the Niger Delta. The agencies 
include the Niger Delta Development Board (NNDB) established in 1961; 
the Niger Delta Basin and Rural Development Authority (NDBRDA) 
established in 1976; the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development 
Commission (OMPADEC) established in 1992; the Petroleum Trust 
Fund (PTF) in 1995; the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) 
established in 2000; and the creation of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
in 2008. Other non-violent mechanisms employed were the occasional 
increment in revenue allocations to the Niger Delta and transitional justice 
and constitutional conferences (see Omotola 2007; Oluwaniyi 2011a; 
Adeyeri 2012).
The violent approach to resolving the crisis manifested in the promulgation 
of military decrees criminalising local protest groups in the region. 
This created an avenue for massive clampdown on the protest groups, given 
their rigidity on addressing the environmental problems arising from oil 
explorations in the region. This event culminated in the execution of 
the leaders of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
otherwise known as the ‘Ogoni 9’ by the military dictatorship of General 
Sani Abacha in 1995, which attracted international condemnations. 
A special military force, the Joint Task Force (JTF), was later created during 
Olusegun Obasanjo’s democratic rule, which signified a total declaration of 
war on the increasingly sophisticated and militarised protest movements in 
the Niger Delta. Unfortunately, these measures escalated the crisis rather 
than solving the problem.2 
2 Human rights abuses alarmingly increased at that time, which further fuelled the anger 
of the peoples of the area; hence the occurrence of an increased rate of violence in the 
Niger Delta. 
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The ineffectiveness of the military approach necessitated the search for a 
different approach to resolve the crisis. Towards this end, the administration 
of (late) Umar Musa Yar’Adua set up the Niger Delta Technical Committee 
(NDTC) – after a rejected peace summit to be headed by Nigeria’s UN 
staff member Ibrahim Gambari – in September 2008 to come up with 
suggestions on conf lict resolution in the Niger Delta (International Crisis 
Group 2009). In order to find legitimacy for the NDTC amongst the 
indigenous peoples of the region, the government strategically ensured that 
all members of the committee have their origins from the nine states that 
characterise the Niger Delta (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, 
Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers States). The main task of the NDTC was to 
examine the report of a previous commission – the Willinks Commission 
in 1958 – and to consolidate the recommendations of that report for 
government action. Amongst other important suggestions, the offering of 
amnesty to the combatants and implementation of DDR were central in 
the recommendations provided by the NDTC (International Crisis Group 
2009). Granting amnesty to the combatants, as well as the acceptance of 
the amnesty by the combatants, would create the needed environment for 
the implementation of the DDR and address the major grievances fuelling 
the age-long conf lict.
Although the government did not officially accept the recommendations 
of the NDTC, it embraced the idea of amnesty for the combatants as a 
measure to encourage negotiations; hence its announcement of a 60-day 
amnesty period (August to October 2011) to combatants willing to accept 
unconditional amnesty in order to kick-start the peace-making process. 
The amnesty simultaneously included a disarmament process as the state’s 
amnesty policy required that the combatants lay down their arms and sign 
the amnesty register indicating their acceptance of the offer (Oluwaniyi 
2011b). At the end of this process, a total of 20 192 combatants came out to 
accept the amnesty and surrendered their weapons to the government. Two 
other phases followed in 2010 and 2012 to accommodate groups that were 
excluded in the first phase given their earlier scepticism about government’s 
intention with the policy. In 2010, 6 166 combatants were included, while 
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3 642 combatants were considered for the third (and final) phase in 2012 
(Oluwaniyi 2011b).
The demobilisation process immediately followed the disarmament 
exercise. The government set up demobilisation camps as centres for the 
demilitarisation and rehabilitation of the ex-combatants for a period of 
time, with the aim to prepare them for a new civilian life. In this process, 
the government offered to pay a sum of N65 000 to the ex-combatants as 
monthly stipends to cater for their immediate needs and discourage them 
from engaging in criminal activities until the end of their reintegration 
(Oluwaniyi 2011b).
In contrast to other DDR programmes in post-conf lict states, which are 
usually managed and funded directly by international organisations and 
donor states, the implementers of the Nigerian DDR define the programme 
as ‘home-grown’. This is because the programme is seemingly designed and 
financed in its entirety by the Nigerian government. According to Kingsley 
Kuku (then the Special Adviser to the President on Amnesty and Niger 
Delta Affairs), ‘the Amnesty programme is the only DDR programme in the 
world that did not rely on the expert advice from the United Nations. It has 
been acknowledged as a unique Nigerian-made peace model, proclaimed, 
funded and managed by Nigerians to this level of success so far without 
any tragic incidents’.3 However, the fact that the programme has sufficient 
connection with external agencies and individuals in its foundational 
designing, as well as government’s collaboration with the multi-national 
oil companies operating in the Niger Delta on the project, may counter 
the government claims that it was ‘home-grown’. It should be noted that 
the oil companies, which include SPDC, Chevron-Texaco, Total, AGIP, 
ConcoPhillips Oando and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), set up the (Oil 
and Gas International Foundation) OGIF to train 3 000 ex-combatants in 
the reintegration process (which is discussed in the next section) (Abazie-
Humphrey 2014). 
3 ‘Government justifies foreign trainings for former militants’, <http://www.oyibosonline.
com/cgi-bin/newsscript.pl?record=9480>
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The immediate success of the disarmament and demobilisation (DD) 
stages of the peace programme can be judged from the sharp decline in 
violent activities – ransom kidnapping, raping, pipeline vandalisation, and 
assassinations – which were alarmingly high in the Niger Delta. Of course, 
this revitalised the dwindling oil production in the region. Oil production 
soared from 700 000 barrels a day to 2.4 million barrels (Abazie-Humphrey 
2014). Besides the oil industry, the peaceful environment generated by the 
DD processes also assisted the local fishing economy, which is the main 
source of livelihood for the peoples of the region. For example, research 
conducted on fishing business in Niger Delta communities after the 
amnesty programme was implemented demonstrated that the local fishers 
recorded about 200 per cent increase in their weekly income (Achoja et al. 
2013:12–16). Also, the successful completion of the DD stages – despite 
immediate challenges including public mistrust of the programme, 
legitimacy issues, implementation problems and logistical hitches 
(Aghedo 2013; International Crisis Group 2009; Oluwaniyi 2011b) – and 
the eventual transition to the reintegration stage should also count as an 
achievement for the amnesty programme. Indeed, this is evinced by the 
eventual acceptance of the government’s peace initiative by the remaining 
combatants who were initially sceptical about the programme. 
3. The reintegration process 
It is useful to note that most of the existing studies on DDR in the Niger Delta 
do not take into consideration the reintegration stage in their analyses. The 
fact that this study is a product of more direct observation and assessment 
of the reintegration process is one of its major contributions to the existing 
literature. 
The reintegration programme has two dimensions. First, the government 
formulated a novel strategy of ‘constructive engagement’ with the 
leadership of the combatants by employing them to establish their own 
private security firms that would be hired to secure oil pipelines and other 
installations on a multi-billion Naira contract agreement (International 
Crisis Group 2009). The logic behind this strategy is to find a meaningful 
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avenue for the militant leaders, who had been exposed to stupendous wealth 
and lifestyle – given their incomes from ransom kidnapping, oil bunkering 
and political patronage – to now have alternative and legitimate sources of 
income after renouncing violence. This will prevent them from returning 
to their violent past. In addition, it is believed that these individuals, 
given their experience with vandalising oil pipelines and installations, 
would better provide the needed security in that regard. According to 
the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta and Amnesty Affairs, 
Kingsley Kuku, ‘I believe that only the people of the communities where 
the pipelines crisscross their backyards can conveniently work with the 
security agencies to stop oil theft and protect the facilities’ (Daniel 2013). 
Indeed, the fact that leaders of combatants in conf lict are not usually given 
special economic opportunities in reintegration arrangements has often 
been one of the reasons for the collapse of DDR in many countries. 
The second dimension is the more popular one, which targets the general 
combatants and non-combatant youths for socio-economic empowerment. 
It is instructive to note that one of the major criticisms of the traditional 
model of DDR is its focus on the combatants alone in the reintegration 
process while neglecting the other members of the society (United Nations 
2010). The fact that this gap is meaningfully addressed in the Niger Delta’s 
reintegration programme is indeed one of its strengths. The reintegration 
programme also includes non-militant youths of the Niger Delta. 
According to the (then) Head of Reintegration of the amnesty programme, 
Lawrence Pepple, the reintegration progress included ‘people who did not 
bear arms (non-combatants) that were drawn from what we call “impacted 
communities” – communities [in] which militant agitation has dwindled 
their economy, stopped their family from doing what they are expected to 
do’ (personal communication, 2014). In this category of the non-militants, 
women are also included. According to the Head of Reintegration, ‘over 
742 women were covered in the programme’ (personal communication, 
2014). The inclusion of women, according to Pepple, is in contrast with the 
Liberian reintegration policy which was based on the expression of ‘one 
man-one gun’ as a basis to preclude women. In confirmation of this claim, 
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we observed a number of women (although insignificant) at the training 
centres in South Africa during our visit. The consideration of women in the 
reintegration process addresses gender bias, one of the major concerns of 
scholars and practitioners on reintegration (see Knight 2008). 
The reintegration process involves vocational training and formal education 
programmes for its beneficiaries. The vocational training involves a wide 
range of vocations that would potentially empower ex-combatants upon 
their reintegration into society. These include piloting, carpentry and 
furniture making, welding, boat building, marine operations, heavy duty 
operations, automobile technology, agricultural operations, oil and gas 
technical operations, electrical and mechanical engineering, and other 
relevant skills. In formal education, the reintegration process creates the 
opportunity for ex-combatants willing to pursue formal education to acquire 
quality education up to tertiary levels (undergraduate and postgraduate) 
in local and foreign universities. A document from the Amnesty Office 
indicates that the education and skills training programmes cover 157 
universities and 22 vocational skills training centres in thirty countries 
across the world. The local education and vocational training programmes 
involve nine universities and nineteen vocational training centres in eight 
states in Nigeria (Office of the Special Adviser to Nigeria President on 
Niger Delta 2014). 
The reintegration process is anchored by two important agencies: the 
Presidential Amnesty Office and the OGIF. The Presidential Amnesty 
Office is the governmental agency established under the presidency to 
solely administer the reintegration programme. The agency is headed by 
the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta and Amnesty Affairs. 
On the other hand, the OGIF is a foundation created by twelve notable 
oil companies operating in the area (Oando PLC, Niger Delta Petroleum 
Resources Limited, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Shell BP, Total, Nigerian 
Liquefied Natural Gas Limited, Schlumberger Oilfield Services, Pan Ocean 
Oil Corporation, Nigerian Petroleum Development Company, Nigerian 
Agip Oil Company, and Addax Petroleum) to work in partnership with 
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the Presidential Amnesty Office to train and empower three thousand 
ex-combatants and youths (Abazie-Humphrey 2014).
As of November 2014, official reports indicate that a total of 18 706 
ex-combatants and youths have acquired formal and informal education, 
out of which 15 392 have graduated in the reintegration programme. Another 
11 294 individuals are being enlisted into the reintegration programme. It 
is noteworthy that the government has indicated an intention to close the 
reintegration programme at the end of 2015. In this regard, the then Special 
Adviser to the President remarked that: ‘It will be in the best interest of 
Nigeria for government to terminate the presidential amnesty programme 
by 2015. If it is not closed by 2015, it will lose its taste. This is because it 
will become an alternative government in the Niger Delta’ (Ehigiator 2013). 
However, this has been a source of controversy as many actors in the region 
are calling for the extension of the programme for more years. Considering 
the many voices who oppose the discontinuation of the programme in 2015, 
and a noticeably weak disengagement plan proposed by the government, 
the new government under President Buhari in February 2016 announced 
an extension of the programme for another two years (until 2018) while 
describing the present phase as an ‘exit strategy’ (Olokor 2016).
4. Appraisal of the reintegration process: Progress and 
challenges
In the analyses of the existing works on Niger Delta’s DDR, the programme 
is often described as a mere ‘cash-for-peace’ or ‘settlement’ exercise that 
will only produce a fragile peace. A more pertinent assessment of the 
programme arising from direct observation and field interviews by our 
researchers provides a different insight into the DDR. It shows that the 
understanding of the programme should go beyond the existing views in the 
literature. There has been progress, which has not been adequately captured 
in the existing analyses. This does not mean that there are no remaining 
challenges in the actualisation of the objectives of the programme and the 
whole peace move in the Niger Delta. Therefore, this section will use a 
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thematic analysis format to more fully identify the observable progress of, 
and challenges to, the reintegration exercise. 
Progress 
Quality training
One good way to assess the reintegration process of the DDR is to look at 
the quality of training being designed for the ex-combatants. It should be 
noted that many reintegration exercises, especially in post-conf lict African 
states, only offer low-quality training programmes (in both formal and 
informal education) to ex-combatants. This is usually due to a paucity of 
funds for broad and competent training. The result is that opportunities 
for reintegration into civilian life are severely limited. For example, 
many Sierra Leonean ex-combatants ended up as small-scale artisans, 
entrepreneurs and farmers because of the kind of training they were 
offered in the reintegration process. For this reason, many of them have 
been unemployed in Freetown and vulnerable to violent activities (Africa 
Renewal 2005). This also represented one of the challenges of reintegration 
in Liberia (Alusala 2011:66). In the Nigerian case, the reintegration 
process is characterised by high-quality educational and vocational skills 
training programmes that have the capacity to empower the demobilised 
combatants after their training programmes. 
Although there is no accurate data on the distribution of beneficiaries 
under the reintegration programme in terms of formal and informal 
education training, it is useful to state that the universities being offered 
to the demobilised combatants and youths of the Niger Delta are some of 
the high-profile and expensive universities in the world. Some of them are 
Coventry University, Portsmouth University, Salford University, Bradford 
University, University of Liverpool, University of Reading, University of 
Newcastle, University of Dundee, University of Kent, Leeds University, 
Kings College and others in the United Kingdom. Others include high-
profile universities in Malaysia, Dubai and Sweden (Office of the Special 
Adviser to the President on Niger Delta 2014). It cannot be disputed that 
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a graduate from any of these universities has better prospects for job and 
economic independence than reintegrated combatants in other parts 
of Africa. This also goes for some of the vocational and skills training 
institutes available to the beneficiaries of the reintegration programme. 
Some of the training centres include Schlumberger Technologies based in 
France (for drilling engineering), Lufthansa Aviation Academy based in 
Germany (for advanced pilot training), CAE Oxford Aviation Academy in 
the United Kingdom (for advanced pilot training), Schneider Electric in 
France (for electrical engineering), Institute of French Petroleum in France 
(for petroleum industry technicians), Airstar Flight School in Italy (for 
pilot training), Comair in South Africa (pilot training), Flight Simulation 
Company in Netherlands (for pilot training), Africa Union Aviation 
Academy in South Africa (pilot training), Adcorp Technical Training in 
South Africa (mining industry technicians), Furntech Furniture in South 
Africa (for furniture making), and a host of others in different parts of 
the world. 
Behavioural change and academic performance
One of the major concerns of scholars and practitioners in the early days 
of the reintegration process was the seeming difficulty in transforming the 
behaviour of the demobilised combatants into that of a decent civilian. 
Truly, this represented a major challenge at the different camps and 
training centres. However, a personal observation of the activities of the 
ex-combatants at their different training centres shows an improvement in 
their dispositions to life. In South Africa, the researchers were able to access 
all such centres and discovered a surprising change in their attitudes. For 
example, as evaluator of training programmes in South Africa, the first 
author asked one leader of ex-combatants if there were frequent cases of 
fights among them. The reply was (in the broken English Language popular 
in Nigeria), ‘It is only someone who does not understand the reason why 
he is here that will engage in unnecessary fight … for me I am not here 
for that’. In an encounter with ex-combatants undertaking diploma 
and degree programmes at a university, one of them told the researcher, 
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‘There is no type of gun that I have not used before … just name it. But I 
am now a changed person. I thank the government for this opportunity’. 
These and other responses show improvement in the behaviour of the 
ex-combatants. 
The above is also corroborated by their instructors at the centres. For 
example, an official of the International Students Office in one of the 
universities stated that the students under the reintegration programme 
were ‘very eager to learn the new environment. They want to be successful’. 
This behavioural change is also ref lected in the academic reports to which 
the researcher had access. The reports on individual conduct and academic 
performance are quite impressive. This also includes their individual 
academic performance. For example, of the fifty-one of the beneficiaries 
of the programme who graduated at a Nigerian private university, Novena 
University, seven had second-class Upper Division passes in subjects as 
Intelligence and Security Studies, Political Science, Energy and Petroleum 
Studies, Accounting or Computer Science (Naij.com 2016). However, this 
does not suggest that there are not a few cases of misbehaviour amongst 
the trainees. In the periods when they were being evaluated, there were 
one or two specific cases of errant behaviour. What is however clear in 
our observation is that some of the trainees were challenged by culture 
shock and sudden environmental change in their new abodes. For instance, 
a prominent complaint by the trainees was the absence of Nigerian dishes, 
which they were promised before they arrived in South Africa for training. 
Also, they were struggling to adapt to the new academic environment and 
challenges since many of them had long gaps in their schooling because of 
the years they spent in the creeks as militants. 
Employment 
The high quality training acquired by the beneficiaries of the reintegration 
programme is, of course, providing good employment opportunities for 
them (although enough achievement is yet to materialise in this area). 
Some examples include the following: fifty of the trainees that went 
for welding and fabrication training at Proclad Group in Dubai were 
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automatically offered employment by the institution upon completion of 
their training; forty-nine trainees who underwent training at Scuola Edile 
Genovese in Italy also gained employment at different shipping companies 
locally and internationally after their training; fourteen trainees who 
trained as mechatronics and welding engineers got employed at Samsung 
Electronics (Office of the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta 
2014); and Schneider Electric in France employed fifteen trainees in 
power management after their training at the company (Daniel 2014). In 
addition to the direct employment offers, the government is also making 
available some funds for business set-ups in small-scale enterprises for 
four thousand beneficiaries of the reintegration programme (Office of 
the Special Adviser to the President on Niger Delta 2014). In summary, it 
is reported in December 2014 that ‘a total of 2 072 ex-agitators have since 
secured gainful employments or have been empowered to set-up their own 
businesses’ (Vanguard, 14 December 2014).
Challenges
Of course, the reintegration programme has a number of challenges which 
explain the huge number of criticisms of the programme. The following are 
some of the challenges observed while studying the reintegration process.
Corruption
Corruption is a major problem in all facets of the Nigerian society. The 
problem of corruption is also increasingly permeating the reintegration 
programme of the DDR. This manifests in several ways. According to 
its design, the Amnesty Office contracts with private agencies to train 
ex-combatants at training centres including universities and vocational 
skills training centres both locally and internationally. In bidding for the 
contract, which is usually competitive, some accounts suggest that bribes 
are offered to the government officials in order to secure the huge budget 
contracts. As a result, inexperienced people who lack the capacity to train 
the ex-combatants secure the contracts. In this regard, the researchers were 
informed of some cases where trainees were f lown abroad ostensibly for 
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training only to be stationed in a hotel accommodation where they received 
the monthly stipend for a long period of time without being trained. This 
partly explains the reason for setting up independent monitoring and 
evaluation teams (in which the first author took part) to sanitise the system. 
In a similar vein, some news reports suggest that the money budgeted for 
the reintegration programme was embezzled by government officials and 
contractors. For example, a news report claimed that eighty per cent of 
the N50 billion budgeted for the take-off of the reintegration process was 
pocketed by consultants and contractors (The Guardian, 14 November 2010, 
cited in Aghedo 2013).
Another dimension of corruption in the programme manifests in the 
process of selection of trainees for programmes, especially in respect of 
attractive skills and degree programmes at high-profile universities and 
training centres abroad. Although the researchers do not have concrete 
information of the illegalities around this process, it was alleged by a 
number of the trainees that individuals are usually selected for programmes 
on the basis of favouritism. A close observation at the centres also confirms 
the allegation because a number of the trainees at the high-profile schools 
and centres appear to be ineligible for the programme because they are 
neither ex-combatants nor youths of the Niger Delta. The researchers were 
also informed that some names are often smuggled into the list of those to 
be trained outside the country. 
Problem of inclusion and placement
The issue of inclusion and placement of ex-combatants for training 
programmes marks another major challenge to the reintegration 
programme. Official reports indicate that 30 000 combatants were 
demobilised in different phases after the declaration of amnesty in 2009. 
Of this number, only 18 706 demobilised combatants have been included 
for reintegration programmes (out of which 15 392 have graduated while 
3 314 are still undergoing training). This suggests that only 62 per cent 
of the ex-combatants have been considered for reintegration, while the 
government has indicated that the programme would officially end in 
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2015. The fact that a considerable number of the ex-combatants are yet to 
be enlisted for programmes portends a great danger to the peace efforts in 
the Niger Delta. 
Related to this problem is the continuous agitation for inclusion into the 
reintegration programme by ex-combatants that initially refused to be 
demobilised in 2009. Following government’s refusal to consider this group 
for reintegration because they did not sign up during the 60-day period 
(between 6 August and 4 October 2009) earmarked for the acceptance of 
amnesty by the combatants, the group has gone to court to challenge the 
decision of the government. The fact that there is still an emergent group 
of aggrieved ex-combatants in the region represents another danger to the 
sustainability of peace in the Niger Delta. 
Given the above, it is not surprising that oil theft has steadily been on the rise 
in the Niger Delta after the amnesty policy was implemented. According to 
reports, an estimate of 100 000 barrels of oil is stolen in Nigeria on a daily 
basis. Furthermore, it is estimated that Nigeria loses about 8 billion USD a 
year to oil theft (Havoscope [2015]). The existence of neglected members of 
the society including youths, women and children that were not sufficiently 
taken into account in the process of reintegration contributes to increasing 
oil theft in the region. Research conducted on oil theft in the area by Ben 
Naanen and Patrick Tolani revealed that ‘[w]omen play pivotal roles in the 
transportation and marketing of the refined products, as well as cooking 
and provision of sexual services for the predominantly male operators’ 
in the illegal oil fields. In addition, ‘[c]hildren, mostly orphans and aged 
between 10 and 13, also work in the illegal bunkering sites and run errands 
at the camps, while absentee owners of illegal refining sites always appoint 
managers to run the operations’ (see Olaniyi 2014).
Politicisation of the programme
Politicisation of government’s management of the reintegration policy is 
another clear problem bedevilling the programme. Given the huge budget 
allocation the programme attracts, suspicions arise within competing 
ethnic groups, regions and political actors in the country. Some groups 
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perceive the programme as a project used to specially empower youths 
of the Niger Delta and a conduit to enrich elites of the area from the 
national oil wealth while neglecting other ethnic groups and regions of the 
country. Thus, there have been increasing demands for the extension of 
empowerment programmes to other parts of the region. It is for this reason 
that some elites in northern Nigeria have been calling for the introduction 
of another DDR programme for the Boko Haram insurgents in the north-
eastern part of the country (see Onapajo and Usman 2015).
Also, in this regard, the federal government under the presidency of 
Goodluck Jonathan saw the opportunity of using the multi-million Naira 
projects around the reintegration programme to secure patronage and 
political support from leaders of the ex-combatants. The ex-militants’ 
leaders were used to threaten the opposition and garner support for the 
president in his bid for re-election in the 2015 general elections. These 
individuals ostensibly re-armed the youths to orchestrate attacks against 
the opposition. This partly explains the source of the violence that surfaced 
in some states of the Niger Delta, especially in Rivers State, during the 2015 
electoral period. 
Post-training opportunities
A general challenge facing DDR programmes in post-conf lict states is 
the availability of job opportunities for reformed combatants. Clearly, 
this represents a major challenge to peacebuilding efforts in the states. In 
this light, Watson (2009:8) noted that in post-conf lict states ‘economic 
systems are often in disarray, aff licted by the breakdown of economic 
markets and the development of non-monetary economies, combined 
with minimal levels of public and private investment and low levels of 
government revenues. In such a situation job opportunities are rare’. In one 
study conducted on Liberia’s ex-combatants, the ex-combatants confessed 
that they were ready to fight again because of unemployment and lack of 
sustainable income (Hill 2008).
The Nigerian case may not be an exception in respect of job scarcity after 
training. Worse still, Nigeria is a country where there is a worrisome high 
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rate of unemployment. Thus, securing jobs for the former combatants 
represents a major challenge despite the fact that a few of them have already 
been employed. Some of the problems border on the issue of stigmatisation 
from the community. Indeed, the fear of securing suitable jobs after the 
training programmes featured prominently in a series of discussions with 
the ex-combatants. For example, a group of trainees at their graduation 
in Cape Town, South Africa, appealed to the government that ‘now that 
we have completed our trainings in various fields, we passionately appeal 
to you to grant us the enabling environment to be able to practicalize the 
skills acquired’.4 
5. Conclusion 
The thrust of this paper was to analyse the progress being made, and 
challenges experienced, in the Nigerian amnesty programme. The paper 
shows that the policy’s successes contradict many of the critical views 
advanced by scholars. Our assessment is that the programme is yielding 
noticeable positive outcomes when its progress is assessed. Indeed, the 
outcomes are a reasonable guarantee that the policy will be instrumental 
to the sustenance of peace and stability in the Niger Delta. However, for 
the amnesty programme to effectively achieve its objectives, there is need 
for the challenges highlighted in the paper to be properly addressed. Given 
the emergence of a totally new government from a different political party 
(following the loss of the president to the opposition candidate in the 2015 
presidential elections) it is quite certain that there will be radical changes 
to the previous government’s policies, including the amnesty programme. 
The governance of the amnesty programme will likely be subjected to 
reform by the new administration. This is ref lected in the appointment 
of Brigadier-General P.T. Boroh as the Coordinator of the PAP in June 
2015. It is recommended that the new administration should not jettison 
the whole idea of the programme given its achievements in rehabilitating 
ex-combatants of the Niger Delta. Rather, the amnesty programme should 
4 Welcome Address Presented by the Niger Delta Amnesty Trainees on the Occasion of Our 
Graduation Ceremony 26 March 2013 at Northlink College, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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be transmuted to usher in a new phase beyond 2015 and consolidate the 
peaceful environment achieved. The process should be capacitated to 
spearhead human capital development in the Niger Delta. Also, it is 
important that the government further reconsiders the neglected members 
of the society including women and children and other aggrieved youths in 
the empowerment programmes. 
In addition, addressing corruption is ostensibly a major agenda for the 
new administration. It is expected that the government will take the issue 
of corruption in the amnesty programme very seriously and block the 
leakages that not only encourage corruption in the programme but also 
affect the success of the programme. 
To guarantee all-round development, there should be a synergy among the 
existing agencies responsible. These include the ministry of Niger Delta, 
The Niger Delta Development Commission, and the Presidential Amnesty 
Office. While the ministry of Niger Delta should oversee the development 
activities in the region, the Niger Delta Development Commission should 
assume its primary function of coordinating development activities in the 
region. The amnesty agency should continue with the training and capacity 
building of the youths and the people in the region. This is to ensure that 
there is no duplication of efforts, and that the development drive of the 
local government, the state government, the federal government, the oil 
multinationals, and the international agencies should be coordinated by, 
and channelled through the aforementioned bodies.
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